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REVOCABILITY OF TRUSTS IN PERSONAL
PROPERTY IN NEW YORK

T

BUSTS

of personal property and securities are created by

settlors during their lifetime for many purposes. Such
trusts are frequently constituted for the purpose of relieving
the settlor of the management of his property; the trustee
being given active duties and powers to manage the property,
collect the income, and pay the same to beneficiaries. 1 Occasionally a settlor seeks to continue to manage the trust property as effectually as he might previously have done.' The
settlor
settlor may constitute himself the trustee, 3 or the
4
may be a beneficiary of the income during his life.
Family settlements may require a power of revocation
to meet the ever-varying interests of family connections."
A power of revocation is analogous to a power of appointment. Such reservations may facilitate a change in the terms
of the settlement arising from the addition or death of members, new occupations or positions in life.' Reservation by
the settlor of the power. of revocation does not of itself make
a trust testamentary. But where there is a power of revocation, the death of the settlor terminates his right to substitute a testamentary disposition for the inter vivos disposition, and the failure to make such substitution is tantamount
'Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 29 F. (2d) 14 (C. C. A. 2d,
1928); Anderson v. Mather, 44 N. Y. 249 (1870); Whittemore v. Equitable
Trust Co., 162 App. Div. 607, 147 N-. Y. Supp. 1058 (1914), infra note 47.
'Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280, 53 Sup. Ct. 369 (1933) ; Burnet v.
Wells, 289 U. S. 670, 53 Sup. Ct. 761 (1933), rezYg, 63 F. (2d) 425 (C. C. A.
8th, 1933); New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Livingston, 133 N. Y. 125,
30 N. E. 724 (1892) ; Matter of Bostwick, 160 N. Y. 489, 55 N. E. 208 (1899) ;
Carrier v. Carrier, 226 N. Y. 114, 123 N. E. 135 (1919) ; Matter of Schmidlaff,
236 N. Y. 278, 140 N. E. 697 (1923) ; Note (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 913.
SReinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 327, 49 Sup. Ct. 126 (1929);
Duke v. Commissioner, 23 B. T. A. 1104 (1931), affd, 62 F. (2d) 1057 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1933); Locke v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 140 N. Y. 135, 35 N. E.
578 (1893).
'Genet v. Hunt, 113 N. Y. 159, 21 N. E. 91 (1889).
'Riggs v. Murray, 2 John. Ch. 565 (N. Y. 1817).
'Cf. Jones v. Clifton, 101 U. S. 225, 25 L. ed. 908 (1879) where it is said
"that the absence of a power of revocation and of appointment to other uses
in a deed of family settlement has often been considered a badge of fraud."
'Van Hesse v. MacKaye, 136 N. Y. 114, 32 N. E. 615 (1892) ; N. Y. Life
Ins. & Trust Co. v. Cary, 191 N. Y. 33, 83 N. E. 598 (1908); Matter of
Brunswick, 143 Misc. 573, 256 N. Y. Supp. 879 (1932) ; cf. however, Porter v.
Commissioner, 288 U. S. 436, 53 Sup. Ct. 451 (1933).
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to an expressed declaration of the settlor that his previous
settlement should stand. Reservation of the beneficial interest and a power of revocation by the settlor is little less
than ownership. However, the retention of a beneficial life
interest by the settlor does not prevent a present legal interest from passing to the trustee.8 Frequently directions
of a testamentary nature as to the disposal of the corpus of
the trust after the settlor's death are incorporated into the
deed creating a trust. In such instances a deed originally
intended to relieve the settlor of managing his property may
take the form of an irrevocable inter vivos transfer.9
In these circumstances the rival interests of the ultimate
beneficiaries under the trust on the one hand, and of the
settlor, when desirous to rid himself of the restrictions of the
trust, or of his creditors,'" on the other, have given rise to
questions of considerable nicety as to the revocability of
trusts. The forms of trusts under which these questions
arise fall into two principal groups: (a) gratuitous unilateral or voluntary trusts 11 and (b) marriage-contract
trusts. 12
8

Mesereau v. Bennett, 124 App. Div. 413, 108 N. Y. Supp. 868

(1st

Dept. 1908).
'Payne, Inter Vivos Transfers and the Federal Estate Tax (1933) 81 U.
OF PA. L. REv. 937, 941.
10Schenck v. Barnes, 156 N. Y. 316, 50 N. E. 967 (1898); Newton v.
Hunt, 134 App. Div. 325, 119 N. Y. Supp. 3 (lst Dept. 1909), aff'd without
opinion 201 N. Y. 599, 95 N. E. 1134 (1911) ; Matter of Blake, 226 App. Div.
580, 235 N. Y. Supp. 324 (1929), aff'd, 252 N. Y. 613, 170 N. E. 163 (1930) ;
Raymond v. Harris, 84 App. Div. 546, 82 N. Y. Supp. 689 (2d Dept. 1903);
Newton v. Jay, 107 App. Div. 457, 95 N. Y. Supp. 413 (lst Dept. 1905).
In this connection -see N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW §145, which specially
provides that "where the grantor in a conveyance reserves to himself for his
own benefit, an absolute power of revocation, he is to be still deemed the
absolute owner of the estate conveyed, so far as the rights of creditors and
purchasers are concerned." The section applies with equal force to similar
conveyances of personalty. Sonnabend v. Gittius, 235 App. Div. 483, 257 N. Y.
Supp. 562 (4th Dept. 1932) ; Syracuse Trust Co. v. Fuller, 140 Misc. 918, 252
N. Y. Supp. 90 (1930).
nMcPherson v. Rollins, 107 N. Y. 316, 14 N. E. 411 (1887) ; Barnard v.
Gantz, 140 N. Y. 249, 35 N. E. 430 (1893) ; Hays v. Union Trust Co., 27 Misc.
240, 57 N. Y. Supp. 801 (1899).
"Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 25 B. T. A. 1153 (1932);
Nearpass v. Newman, 106 N. Y. 47, 12 N. E. 557 (1887); Guaranty Trust Co.
v. Halstead, 245 N. Y. 447, 157 N. E. 739 (1927); Hutchinson v. Ross, 262
N. Y. 381, 187 N. E. 65 (1933).
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Where the settlor expressly reserves the power to revoke
13
the trust, generally no difficulty as to its revocation arises.
14
But in-the absence of a power of revocation, the revocability
of a trust must be determined by certain fundamental common law principles. Under the common law a voluntary
trust, with no power of revocation reserved, is generally irrevocable in the absence of mistake, undue influence or fraud.
A voluntary trust fairly created can only be revoked by the
settlor when a clause in the instrument reserves this power,
or where there is evidence that the instrument was executed
in ignorance of its effect or under mistake, duress or fraud.' 5
'A voluntary trust upon a meritorious consideration, perexecuted, is irrevocable and will be
fectly created and fully
6
enforced in equity.'

When an inter vivos trust is constituted for matrimonial
purposes, different questions arise. A marriage settlement
agreement may comprehend' contractual provisions for the
' Bank of New York & Trust Co. v. Commissioner; 20 B. T, A. 677
(1930); Van Cott v. Prentice, 104 N. Y. 45, 10 N. E. 257 (1887); New York
Life Ins. Co. & Trust Co. v. Cary, 191 N. Y. 33, 83 N. E. 598 (1908) ; Matter
of Miller, 236 N. Y. 290, 104 N. E. 701 (1923).
"A power of revocation "is not an interest in the property which can be
transferred to another, or sold on execution, or devised by will. * * * Nor is
the power a chose in action." Jones v. Clifton, 101 U. S. 225, 25 L. ed. 908
See also Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Bowers, 29 F. (2d) 14
(1879).
(C. C. A. 2d, 1928); Matter of Cochrane, 117 Misc. 18, 190 N. Y. Supp. 895
(1921), aff'd without opinion, 202 App. Div. 807, 194 N. Y. Supp. 924 (2d
Dept. 1922); (1921) 38 A. L. R. 957.
"Ludlam v. Ludlam, 194 App. Div. 411, 185 N. Y. Supp. 343 (1st Dept.
1920); cf. McGuire v. McGuire, 201 App. Div. 71, 193 N. Y. Supp. 772 (2d
Dept. 1922); Conkling v. Davis, 14 Abb. 499 (N. C. 1878); Gibbs v. New
York Life Ins. & Trust Co., 14 Abb. 1 (N. C. 1883).
"Gilchrist v. Stevenson, 9 Barb. 9 (N. Y. 1850); Meiggs v. Meiggs, 15
Hun 453 (N. Y. 1878); Thebaud v. Schermerhorn, 61 How. Pr. 200 (N. Y.
1881); Wallace v. Verdell, 97 N. Y. 13 (1884); Nearpass v. Newman, 106
N. Y. 47, 12 N. E. 557 (1887); McPherson v. Rollins, Barnard v. Gantz,
Hays v. Union Trust Co., all supra note 11; Godwin v. Broadway Trust Co.,
87 Misc. 130, 149 N. Y. Supp. 1033 (1914); Stevenson, Revocation of Trust

by the Settlor (1903) 57

CENTRAL

L. J. 183;

BOGERT, TRUSTS,

248.

"A voluntary settlement, fairly made, is always binding in equity
upon the grantor, unless there be clear and decisive proof, that he never
parted, nor intended to part, with the possession of the deed, and even if
he retains it, the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of its validity,
unless there be other circumstances, beside the mere fact of his retaining
it, to show it was not intended to be absolute."
Chancellor Kent in Souverbeye v. Arden, 1 John. Ch. 240 (N. Y. 1814). See
also Bunn v. Winthrop, 1 John. Ch. 329 (N. Y. 1815) ; Geary v. Page, 9 Bos.
290 (N .Y. 1862).
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kin of either or both of the parties. Of the obligatory and
irrevocable nature of an ante-nuptial contract without a
power of revocation, there is no room for doubt.' 7 A postnuptial agreement, however, may be voluntary. And, in
the absence of the reservation of a power to revoke, it is
irrevocable. 8 In a question involving creditors' rights it
may be important to determine whether there was any consideration for the execution of the trust deed. 9 As between
the parties, provisions for spouses 20 and children may be
contractual, i.e., affected by the element of contract involved."' But questions of public policy may be involved
due to the relationship of the parties. Such trusts may be
irrevocable by both or either of the spouses and superior to
the rights of creditors. Usually such trusts cannot be recalled by one spouse alone. Whether a particular trust deed
confers rights upon prospective beneficiaries frequently
raises questions of construction of the deed. Provisions
conceived in identical terms may have very different force
and effect according as they are in favor of a wife or of
22
children, and as the marriage is existent or dissolved.
Furthermore, whether the deed is revocable or irrevocable
may depend upon the question whether there are persons,
other than the creator of the trust, who are beneficially interested in the trust or any part thereof. A determination
of these problems is the purpose of this article.
The beneficiaries of the trust, the trustee, the owner of
the reversion or remainder, and the settlor represent all
possible interests, legal or equitable, in a trust property.
' Watson v. Bonney, 2 Sand. 405 (N. Y. 1849); Wetmore v. Kissam,

3 Bos. 321 (N. Y. 1858) ; Seavitt v. Pell, 25 N. Y. 474 (1862) ; cf. Matter of
Sertz, 262 N. Y. 32, 186 N. E. 193 (1933).
"Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 40 Hun 91 (N. Y. 1886) ; Gilman v. McArdle,
99 N. Y. 451, 2 N. E. 464 (1885); see also Hutchinson v. Ross, 262 N. Y.
381, 187 N. E. 65 (1933), affg, 233 App. Div. 516, 253 N. Y. Supp. 889 (1st
Dept. 1931) where the consents signed by the cestui que trustent were obtained
by misrepresentation.
" Schenck v. Barnes, supra note 10; Brown v. Spohr, 180 N. Y. 201,
73 N. E. 14 (1904).
- Cf. Chaplin, Future Trusts for a "Husband," "Wife," or "Widow"
(1927) 36 YALE L. J. 336.
'Meeker v. Wright, 76 N. Y. 262 (1879); Tallinger v. Mandeville, 113
N. Y. 427, 21 N. E, 125 (1889).
2 Levy v. Dockendorff, 177 App. Div. 249, 163 N. Y. Supp. 435 (2d
Dept. 1917).
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The nature of the interest of the cestui que trust should be

fully understood. Under the law of New York, a beneficiary
during life of the income of a trust fund has no property

interest in the income arising from the securities constituting the trust fund, but has only a chose in action available
against the trustee to enforce the performance of the trust
in equity. The persons for whose benefit the trust is created

take no estate or interest in the corpus; the whole estate in
23
law and in equity being in the trustee.
The beneficiary of a trust to receive the income of per-

sonal property in New York is prohibited by statute from
assigning or in any manner disposing of the same, 24 and

statutory provisions prohibit the trustee from doing anything in contravention of the trust. 25

Thus, the statute pro-

hibits alienation by the beneficiary, except where the settlor
'Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U. S. 20, 53 Sup. Ct. 417 (1933); Coster v.
Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265 (N. Y. 1835); Gilman v. Reddington, 24 N. Y. 9
(1861); Bennett v. Garlock, 79 N. Y. 302 (1880); Marx v. McGlynn, 88 N. Y.
357 (1882) ; Schenck v. Barnes, 156 N. Y. 316, 50 N. E. 967 (1898) ; Matter
of United States Trust Co., 175 N. Y. 304, 67 N. E. 614 (1903) ; Metcalfe v.
Union Trust Co., 181 N. Y. 39, 73 N. E. 498 (1905); Melenky v. Melen, 233
N. Y. 19, 134 N. E. 822 (1922); People ex rel. Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Loughman, 226 App. Div. 41, 234 N. Y. Supp. 336 (1929), aff'd sub norn. People
ex rel. Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Lynch, 251 N. Y. 569, 168 N. E. 430 (1929) ;
Archer-Shee v. Garland [1931] App. Cas. 212; Ames, Purchaser for Value
Without Notice (1887) 1 HARV. L. REv. 9; Stone, The Nature of the Rights
of the Cestui Que Truist (1917) 17 COL. L. REv. 467; Pound, Book Review
(1913) 26 HARV. L. REv. 462; HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS
24,106.
As respects the interest remaining in the settlor, N. Y. REAL PROPERTY
LAW §102 provides that "where an express trust is created, every legal estate
and interest not embraced in the trust, and not otherwise disposed of, shall
remain in or revert to, the person creating the trust." Cf. Guaranty Trust Co.
v. Halsted, 245 N. Y. 447, 159 N. E. 739 (1927); Livingston v. Ward, 247
N. Y. 97, 159 N. E. 875 (1928); Phelps v. Thompson, 119 Misc. 875, 198
N. Y. Supp. 325 (1922); First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Yonkers v. Palmer,
141 Misc. 692, 254 N. Y. Supp. 16 (1931). See also N. Y. Life Ins. & Trust
Co. v. Livingston, 133 N. Y. 125, 30 N. E. 724 (1892); N. Y. Life Ins. &
Trust Co. v. Cary, 191 N. Y. 33, 83 N. E. 598 (1908) ; Montague v. Curtis,
110 Misc. 717, 181 N. Y. Supp. 709 (1919), aff'd, 191 App. Div. 904, 181 N. Y.
Supp. 940 (1st Dept. 1920) ; Matter of Dunlap, 205 App. Div. 128, 199 N. Y.
Supp. 147 (1st Dept. 1923).
I N. Y. PERSONAL PROP. LAW §15; cf. Matter of Ungrich, 201 N. Y. 415,
94 N. E. 999 (1911); Matter of Wentworth, 230 N. Y. 176, 129 N. E. 646
(1920); Matter of Bendit, 214 App. Div. 446, 212 N. Y. Supp. 526 (1st
Dept. 1925).
25N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW §105. The same rule governs trusts of personal
property. Genet v. Hunt, 113 N. Y. 158, 21 N. E. 91 (1889); Cuthbert v.
Chauvert, 136 N. Y. 326, 32 N. E. 1088 (1893) ; Hoskin v. Long Island Loan
& Trust Co., 139 App. Div. 258, 123 N. Y. Supp. 994 (2d Dept. 1910), aff'd
203 N. Y. 588, 96 N. E. 1116 (1911).
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creates the trust for his own benefit. 26

And a beneficiary,

who acquires the remainder and becomes the person most
27
interested in the trust estate, cannot terminate the trust.
In New York neither a failure to reserve the right to
revoke, nor a provision in the agreement that the trust shall
be irrevocable, will destroy the settlor's statutory right of
revocation of a trust in personal property upon compliance
with the statute. 28 Section 23 of the Personal Property
Law, which was added by the Laws

29

of 1909, reads as

follows:
"Revocation of trusts upon consent of all persons
interested. Upon the written consent of all the persons beneficially interested in a trust in personal
property or any part thereof heretofore or hereafter
created, the creator of such trust may revoke the
same as to the whole or such part thereof, and thereupon the estate of the trustee shall cease in the whole
or such part thereof."
The provision has been held constitutional. 0 By its
terms it is retroactive and confers power to revoke trusts
theretofore created.

31

Matter of Blake, 226 App. Div. 580, 235 N. Y. Supp. 324 (1st Dept.
1929), aff'd, 252 N. Y. 613, 170 N. E. 163 (1930) ; see also authorities cited
note 91, infra.
The assignment of half the interest of a trust income for the support of a
legally separated wife is not such an "alienation" of the trust fund as is
prohibited by statute. In re Yard's Estate, 116 Misc. 19, 189 N. Y. Supp.
190 (1921).
Nor do the provisions of §15 of the New York Personal Property Law
affect rights created by operation of law. Matter of Bendit, sapra note 24.
"'Lent v. Howard, 89 N. Y. 169 (1882) ; Matter of Wentworth, 230 N. Y.
176, 129 N. E. 646 (1920); Dale v. Guaranty Trust Co., 168 App. Div. 601,
153 N. Y. Supp. 1041 (1st Dept.. 1915) ; In re Lee's Estate, 114 Misc. 511,
187 N. Y. Supp. 176 (1921); see Cuthbert v. Chauvert, 136 N. Y. 326, 32 N.
E. 1088 (1893).
SAranyi v. Bankers' Trust Co., 201 App. Div. 706, 194 N. Y. Supp. 614
(1st Dept. 1922); Franklin v. Chatham PhenixNational Bank & Trust Co.,
234 App. Div. 369, 255 N. Y. Supp. 115 (1st Dept. 1932); Berlenbach v.
Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 235 App. Div. 170, 256 N. Y. Supp. 563 (1st
Dept. 1932), aff'd without opinion, 260 N. Y. 539, 184 N. E. 83 (1932);
Schwartz v. Fulton Trust Co., 119 Misc. 831, 198 N. Y. Supp. 275 (1922).
N. Y. Laws 1909, c. 247.
='Court v. Bankers' Trust Co., 221 N. Y. 608, 116 N. E. 1041 (1917).
" Hoskin v. Long Island Loan & Trust Co., 139 App. Div. 258, 123 N. Y.
Supp. 994 (2d Dept. 1910), aff'd on opinion below, 203 N. Y. 588, 96 N. E.
1116 (1911); Sperry v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 App. Div. 447, 139
N. Y. Supp. 192 (1st Dept. 1913) ; Cruger v. Union Trust Co., 173 App. Div.
797, 160 N. Y. Supp. 480 (1916).
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Section 15 of the New York Personal Property Law,
which was contained in Section 3 of the old Personal Property Law, formerly contained a provision of historical interest.32 However, the provision was omitted thirty years
ago. 33 At the present time the provision in Section 15 that
"the right of the beneficiary to enforce the performance of
a trust to receive the income of personal property and to
apply it to the use of any person, cannot be transferred by
assignment or otherwise," does not conflict with Section 23
of the Personal Property Law, above quoted.3

4

Except in

certain instances, Section 15 prohibits a beneficiary to
transfer his right to enforce performance of a trust in personal property. Section 23 deals with the revocation of such
a trust. The settlor of the trust and the person entitled
to the reversion or the remainder, if in other respects competent to act, could always release or convey any or all
rights which they might have in the subject-matter of the
trust. The effect of Section 23 of the Personal Property
Law is to remove from the beneficiaries and the trustee the
statutory prohibitions which had theretofore existed, thus
making them free to act in regard thereto. When the necessary written consent of all the persons beneficially interested
,' N. Y. Laws 1897, c. 417, §3 reads as follows:
"Wherever a beneficiary in a trust for the receipt of the income of
personal property is entitled to a remainder in the whole or part of the
principal fund so held in trust, subject to his beneficial estate for a life
or lives, or a shorter term, he may release his interest in such income,
and thereupon the estate of the trustee shall cease in that part of such
principal fund to which such beneficiary has become entitled in remainder,
and such trust estate merges in such remainder."
Cf. Chaplin, Destruction of Express Trusts by Merger (1903) 3 COL. L. REv.
155.
,' N. Y. Laws 1903, c. 87. See Matter of U. S. Trust Co., 175 N. Y. 304,
67 N. E. 614 (1903); Metcalfe v. Union Trust Co., 181 N. Y. 39, 73 N. E. 498
(1905); Thall v. Dreyfuss, 84 App. Div. 569, 82 N. Y. Supp. 691 (2d Dept.
1903); Phillips v. Pike, 121 App. Div. 753, 106 N. Y. Supp. 486 (1st Dept.
1907); Connolly v. Connolly, 122 App. Div. 492, 107 N. Y. Supp. 185 (2d
Dept. 1907); Matter of Barber, 36 Misc. 433, 73 N. Y. Supp. 749 (1901);
Matter of Gibson, 42 Misc. 157, 85 N. Y. Supp. 1077 (1903) ; Robinson v. New
York Life Insurance & Trust Co., 75 Misc. 361, 133 N. Y. Supp. 257 (1912).
See also FoWLER, PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW OF NEW YORK §15.
' Baker v. Fifth Avenue Bank of New York, 225 App. Div. 238, 232 N. Y.
Supp. 238 (1st Dept. 1928). See infra note 63.
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in the trust is obtained, the trust terminates as a matter of
law.

35

Section 23 of the Personal Property Law neither enlarges nor restricts the class of those who answer the description of persons "beneficially interested" in a trust estate.
Whatever beneficial interest one has in a trust estate before
or since the enactment of Section 233 6continues in precisely
the same nature, quality and degree.
A consideration of the authorities which have interpreted the meaning of the words "beneficially interested" in
a trust in personal property, which are found in Section 23,
necessarily requires a knowledge of the perplexing problems
of the law of New York respecting future interests in personal property.3 7 And in any discussion of the subject, it
is necessary to determine the precise meaning of the words
"beneficially interested" as used in this particular section
of the Personal Property Law. The word "interested," as
used in the statute " authorizing the court, upon the petition of any person interested in the execution of an express
trust, to remove the trustee, was defined in Matter of Livingstow2s Petition.3 9 The term "beneficially entitled," as used
40
in the Transfer Tax Law was construed in several cases.
Where a gift is dependent upon survivorship, and there are
no words importing a present gift, the gift is future and
contingent and not immediate and vested and is neither a
future nor contingent estate or interest but is nothing more
than a mere possibility. 4 1 But the words "beneficially in'Matter of United States Trust Co., 175 N. Y. 304, 76 N. E. 614 (1903);
Hoskins v. Long Island Loan & Trust Co., supra note 31.
'Robinson v. New York Life Ins. & Trust Co., 75 Misc. 361, 133 N. Y.
Supp. 257 (1912).

'Moore v. Littel, 41 N. Y. (16 (1869); Upington v. Corrigan, 151 N. Y.
143, 45 N. E. 359 (1896); Clowe v. Seavey, 208 N. Y. 496, 102 N. E. 521
(1913); Brown v. Robinson, 224 N. Y. 301, 120 N. E. 694 (1918); Gray,
Future Interests in Personal Property (1901) 14 HARV. L. REv. 397; Schnebly,

Extinguishent of Contingent Future Interests by Decree and Without Coln-

pensation (1931) 44 HARv. L. Rv. 378.
IN. Y. REAL PROP. LAW §112 (2).
34 N. Y. 555 (1866).

*°Matter of Curtis, 142 N. Y. 219, 36 N. E. 887 (1894); Matter of
Roosevelt, 143 N. Y. 120, 38 N. E. 281 (1894).

213 N. Y. 109, 107 N. E. 44 (1914).

See also Matter of Zborowski,

,Smith v. Edwards, 88 N. Y. 92 (1882); Shipman v. Rollins, 98 N. Y.
311 (1885); Townsend v. Frommer, 125 N. Y. 446, 26 N. E. 805 (1891);
Campbell v. Stokes, 142 N. Y. 23, 36 N. E. 811 (1894); Matter of Crane, 164
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terested" and "entitled," as used in that portion of section 3
of the old Personal Property Law 42 which was omitted thirty
years ago, were held to refer not only to a right which is
vested in a present interest, but which is also free from the
possibility of an ultimate defeasance. 4 3 But these terms are
not necessarily synonymous or interchangeable with the same
words in a different statute. It should be apparent, therefore, that the meaning of the words "beneficially interested"
in Section 23 of the Personal Property Law can only be ascertained by a consideration of the cases which have involved
the construction of this section. The determination of the
question as to who are beneficially interested in a trust necessarily requires a construction of the deed of trust. It is
44
proposed to discuss some of these cases.
I
Problems as to the interpretation and application of
the statutory phrase authorizing a revocation of the trust
arise where the settlors have created inter vivos trusts without reserving to themselves a power of revocation. In the
first group we shall consider the cases where there are no
persons in being, who upon the settlor's death, take an interest in the trust estate by virtue of the trust deed. More
specifically, in this group we shall consider the decisions
where the ultimate beneficiaries take by descent rather than
by purchase.
In Hoskin v. Long Island Loan & Trust Co.45 and
Sperry v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.," the trustee's duties
N. Y. 71, 58 N. E. 47 (1900) ; Matter of Terry, 218 N. Y. 218, 112 N. E. 931
(1916); Boncicault v. Lenbuscher, 124 Misc. 223, 207 N. Y. Supp. 1 (1924);
Gluck, The Divide and Pay Over Ride in New York (1924) 24 COL. L. REv. 8.
Supra note 32.
"Matter of Hogarty, 62 App. Div. 79, 70 N. Y. Supp. 839 (1st Dept.
1901); Thall v. Dreyfuss, 84 App. Div. 569, 82 N. Y. Supp. 691 (2d Dept.
1903)..
"Note (1929) 7 N. Y. L. Rav. 42 is incomplete. See also Note (1932) 41
YALE L. J. 913. Cf. the annotation on the right of creator to revoke or
procure cancellation of voluntary trust (1924) 38 A. L. R. 941.
" 139 App. Div. 258, 213 N. Y. Supp. 994 (2d Dept. 1910), aff'd on opinion
of Burr, J., 203 N. Y. 588, 96 N. E. 1116 (1911).
"154 App. Div. 447, 139 N. Y. Supp. 192 (1st Dept. 1913).
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ceased with the death of the beneficiary, and the trustee in
one case was then required to pay to appointees under a
will, if any, and in the other to pay to the executor or administrator of the settlor of the trust. It was held in those
cases that by reason of the terms of the trust there was no
person in being who, upon the death of the settlor, would
take any interest in the trust estate by virtue of the trust
deed, and consequently the settlor could revoke the trust
without any one's consent.
In Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co.,47 sometimes referred to as the Mabel Whittemore case, it was held that
where the trustees were directed in a certain event to distribute the property to the heirs 48 and next of kin " of the
," 162 App. Div. 607, 147 N. Y. Supp. 1058 (1st Dept. 1914).
48
"In strictness of legal nomenclature the term 'heir' in this country
and in England, where the common law prevails, signifies one upon
whom the law casts his ancestor's estate immediately upon the ancestor's
death.".
Matter of James, 80 Hun 371, 30 N. Y. Supp. 1 (1894).
"In its technical and strictly correct sense the word 'heir' is one of
limitation and representation denoting descent and is not one of purchase."
Matter of Barker, 230 N. Y. 364, 130 N. E. 579 (1921). See also Woodward
v. James, 115 N. Y. 346, 22 N. E. 150 (1889).
"The word 'heirs' while generally and technically conveying the idea
of representation, is not necessarily always to be understood in that
sense. Though a word of limitation, it is used * * * as one of designation of the devisees, in whom at a fixed time the estate devised shall
vest in possession."
Gray, J., in Bisson v. West Shore R. Co., 143 N. Y. 125, 38 N, E. 104 (1894).
See also Matter of Tarnago, 220 N. Y. 225, 115 N. E. 462 (1917).
"While the word 'heir,' which has a popular as well as a technical
meaning, is, under special circumstances, held to include 'next of kin,'
the latter phrase, which has not acquired a popular meaning, but has a
technical meaning only, is never held, when standing alone, to include
heirs at law. 'Heir' may have either of two meanings, but 'next of kin'
when used simpliciter, * * * only one."
Vann, ., in N. Y. Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Hoyt, 161 N. Y. 1, 55 N. E. 299
(1899).
"The word 'heirs' is a legal term having a definite meaning, and expresses
the relation of persons to a deceased ancestor and not to a living, according to the maxim, 'nemo est haeres viventis.' Its primary import relates
to the succession to real property. When it is used to denote succession,
or substitution, in connection with a legacy of personal property, it may
have the sense of denoting the persons on whom the law will cast the
succession to that sort of property."
Cushman v. Horton, 59 N. Y. 149 (1874).
do
"The primary meaning in the law of the word 'heirs' is the persons
related to one by blood, who would take his real estate if he died
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cestui que trust according to law, there was no intention
to create a limitation over to such persons as might answer
that description, but merely to direct that the property pass
according to law, in which case the heirs and next of kin
intestate, and the word embraces no one not thus related. It is not
strictly proper to designate the persons who succeed to the personal
estate of an intestate. The proper primary signification of the words
'next of kin' is those related by blood, who take personal estate of one
who dies intestate, and they bear the same relation to personal estate as
the word does to real estate. The words 'heirs' and 'next of kin' would
not ordinarily be used by any testator to designate persons who were not
related to him by blood."
Earl, J., in Tillman v. Davis, 95 N. Y. 17 (1884).
"We think a gift to 'heirs' or 'next of kin' is the same in meaning and
effect as one to 'legal heirs,' or 'legal next of kin,' and that one as much
as the other imports a reference to the statute."
Cardozo, J., in New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Winthrop, 237 N. Y. 93,
142 N. E. 431 (1923). See also Lawton v. Corlies, 127 N. Y. 100, 27 N. E.
847 (1891) ; Wallace v. Diehl, 202 N. Y. 156, 95 N. E. 646 (1911) ; Salter v.
Downe, 205 N. Y. 204, 98 N. E. 401 (1912) ; Matter of Mersereau, 233 N. Y.
540, 135 N. E. 909 (1922); Matter of Evans, 234 N. Y. 42, 136 N. E. 233
(1922); Matter of Young, 242 N. Y. 237, 151 N. E. 218 (1926); Waxson
Realty Corp. v. Rothchild, 255 N. Y. 332, 174 N. E. 700 (1931) ; Matter of
Burrows, 259 N. Y. 449, 182 N. E. 79 (1932) ; Wright v. Methodist Episcopal
Church, Hoffm. Ch. (N. Y. 1839); Wetmore v. Peck, 66 How. Pr. 54
(N. Y. 1882); McCormick v. Burke, 2 Dem. 137 (N. Y. 1884-); Treadwell
v. Montange, 2 Dem. 570 (N. Y. 1884); Annotation: "Heirs" as Substituted
Beneficiaries (1931) 78 A. L. R. 992, 1009.
"Husband and wife are not and never were regarded as next of kin to
each other. By the primary meaning of these words only relatives in
blood are understood."
Gray, J., in Platt v. Mickle, 137 N. Y. 106, 32 N. E. 1070 (1893).
Article 3 of the New York Decedent Estate Law, as amended by Laws
of 1929, c. 229, §6 and the Laws of 1930, c. 174, §2, make uniform the
devolution of both real and personal property, thereby abolishing all distinction
beween the persons who are entitled to the real and personal property of a
decedent and substituting a single rule for the determination of degrees of
consanguinity. The statute reads, in part, as follows:
"All distinctions between the persons who take as heirs at law or next
of kin are abolished and the descent of real property and the distribution
of personal property shall be governed by this article except as otherwise
specifically provided by law. Whenever in any statute the words 'heirs,'
'heirs at law,' 'next of kin,' or 'distributees,' are used, such words shall
be construed to mean and include the persons entitled to take as provided
by this article."
See Matter of Wendel, 143 Misc. 480, 257 N. Y. Supp. 87 (1932).
The word "distributee" is designed to include both "heirs at law" and "next
of kin." Matter of Gant, 142 Misc. 446, 254 N. Y. Supp. 715 (1932) ; Matter
of Kassam, 141 Misc. 366, 252 N. Y. Supp. 706 (1931), aff'd without opinion,
235 App. Div. 609, 255 N. Y. Supp. 835 (1st Dept. 1932).
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respectively would take by descent and not by virtue of the
deed of trust and accordingly had no interest in the trust.
In Cram v. Walker 50 the income of the trust was to be
paid equally to the settlor and his wife during their joint
lives. Upon the death of either the trust was to be divided
into two equal parts; one part was then to be transferred
unto the then living child or children 51 of the settlor and
his wife and the other part was to be held separate, the income thereof to be paid to the survivor for life and upon
the death of such survivor such part was to be transferred
"to the then living child or children, or the then living issue
of a deceased child or children" of the settlor and his wife.
The wife died, leaving her surviving the settlor and one
child of the marriage. One-half of the principal of the trust
fund was thereupon conveyed to such child. The settlor
remarried and had a daughter by the second wife. The son
was unmarried and without issue. It was held that the
settlor and the son by the first marriage were the only persons beneficially interested in the deed of trust within the
meaning of the said Section 23. Page, J., said at page 806:
"It seems to me to be clearly the meaning of the
statute that a trust in personal property is revocable
by the creator thereof upon the consent of all persons
in being who are beneficially interested therein, and
if there be no other person in being who has either
a vested or contingent interest in the trust, such revocation is effectual."
In Cruger v. Union Trust Co.51 which was decided the
same day by the same court which decided the Cram case,
supra, the trust agreement directed the trustee to pay the
income to the settlor during his life and upon his death to
convey the principal as directed by the last will and testament of the settlor; and in default of such direction, then
173 App. Div. 804, 160 N. Y. Supp. 486 (1st Dept. 1916).
' "The term 'children' is primarily and technically used us a word of
purchase and not of limitation, and the immediate descendants of the person
named as the ancestor." Lytle v. Beveridge, 58 N. Y. 592 (1874). See also
Aranyi v. Bankers' Trust Co., infra note 56.
173 App. Div. 797, 160 N. Y. Supp. 480 (1st Dept. 1916).
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to such persons in such shares and proportions as they would
be entitled to receive under the statutes of New York if
the settlor died intestate. The right to dispose of the corpus
of the trust by will did not make any one else beneficially
interested in the trust. Consequently, the settlor might revoke the trust. The Cruger case does not conflict with the
Cram case.
In Oazzani v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co.5S the settlor
conveyed certain personal property to a trustee under a
deed of trust which required the trustee to pay the income
to the settlor during her life. Upon the death of the settlor
the trustee was directed to divide the corpus into four equal
parts and pay the income thereof to the settlor's mother,
a sister and two brothers during their lives; and upon the
death of any of said four persons the share set aside for
such beneficiary was directed to be transferred by the trustee to such person or persons as the settlor should direct
by her will, and in default of such direction then to pay the
principal thereof over to the next of kin of the settlor in
the manner and proportion directed by the laws of the state
of New York as to distribution of estates of persons dying
intestate. In an action by the settlor to revoke the deed
of trust it was held that inasmuch as the mother and the
brothers and sister had an interest in the trust, it could not
be revoked without their consent. Page, J., said at page
371:
"The mother, brothers and sister of the grantor in
the case at bar have, during their lives, a vested remainder in the trust estate. They are persons in
being, who, if the grantor and life tenant should now
die, would be instantly entitled to the income of their
respective shares. Naturally their interests being
only life interests are neither descendible or devisable,
and by statute they are made inalienable, but this
same fact would be true if the grantor were now dead
and if they were now enjoying the present beneficial
use' and income from their respective shares. Such
175 App. Div. 369, 161 N. Y. Supp. 884 (2d Dept. 1916), aff'd on
opinion of Page, J., 220 N. Y. 683, 116 N. E. 1040 (1917).
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right to the income would, under the statute, be inalienable (Dale v. Guaranty Trust Co, 168 App. Div.
601), and, of course, being a life interest would be
neither descendible nor devisable. There can be no
doubt that such an interest would be a beneficial interest in the deed of trust, in spite of the fact that it
was neither descendible, devisable nor alienable. It
is clear that though every interest which is descendible, devisable and alienable is a beneficial interest,
it does not follow that an interest which has none of
these attributes is necessarily not a beneficial
interest."
The court pointed out that the test of the existence of a
beneficial interest laid down by Judge Seabury in Robinson
v. New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. 4 as an interest which is
not "descendible, devisable, or alienable" was inadvisedly
made.5
In Aranyi v. Bankers Trust Co.56 the settlor executed
a trust agreement which provided that it was to terminate
when she arrived at the age of thirty-five years; that in case
of her death before that time, the trustee was to transfer
the principal of the trust fund in equal shares to the children of the settlor then living; and that if she died without
leaving children, then the trustee was to transfer the fund
to such persons as the settlor should designate by her will.
The settlor had no children and there was no issue of any
deceased child. Accordingly, it was held that since the
settlor was the only person in being having a vested or contingent interest in the trust, she had the right to revoke the
same.
In Matter of Hawes 57 a resident of Massachusetts exe-"
cuted a deed of trust conveying certain real and personal
property located in the state of Massachusetts to a trustee,
to pay the income to himself, and, upon his death, to convey
the corpus in such manner and to such persons as he might
1175 Misc. 361, 133 N. Y. Supp. 257 (1912).
Cf. Hammond v. Chemung Canal Trust Co., 141 Misc. 158, 252 N. Y.
Supp. 259 (1931), infra note 60.
201 App. Div. 706, 194 N. Y. Supp. 614 (1st Dept. 1922).
0'162 App. Div. 173, 147 N. Y. Supp. 329 (1st Dept. 1914).
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direct by will, or in default of any such will, to convey the
same according to the statute of descent and distribution.
When the deed of trust was executed none of the corpus of
the fund was actually or constructively in the state of New
York. Subsequent to the execution of the deed, but before
the death of the settlor, the trustee sold a part of the property, and with the proceeds purchased shares of stock of
a New York corporation. The shares were a part of the
corpus of the trust fund at the settlor's death. He died
intestate and the question was presented as to whether his
heirs and next of kin took as remaindermen under the deed
of trust, in which case they would have had to pay no transfer tax to the state of New York, or whether they took as
heirs and next of kin, in which case a 'transfer tax was due.
The court held that the tax was due. Thus, the legal effect
of the decision is that such a direction does not create a
remainder, but a reversion in the grantor.
In Matter of Merritt 58 the settlor conveyed all her
property to a trustee, to apply the income to her use during
her life, and, upon her death, upon the further trust, to
convey the property so held in trust to such persons as by
her last will and testament she might designate; or, in default of making such will, then, to convey the same to such
person or persons as by the law of the state of New York,
then in force, relating to the descent and distribution of
real and personal property of intestate decedents would be
entitled to receive the said property if the instrument had
not been executed and said settlor had died, seized and possessed of, and being the lawful owner of said property. By
an instrument in writing, the settlor attempted to revoke
the trust. But the court held that the trust was irrevocable,
because the settlor had given a remainder interest to other
persons. The court was of the opinion that the heirs-at-law
and next of kin of the settlor would not take title as such,
but as purchasers under the deed of trust.
It is submitted that Matter of Merritt is in conflict
with, and has been overruled by, subsequent cases, unless
it can be sustained on the theory that the deed of trust did
' 94 Misc. 425, 159 N. Y. Supp. 588 (1916).
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not designate her next of kin as such but those persons who
would be next of kin if the settlor died a resident of New
York and she might die a resident of some other state having different intestacy laws.
In Schwartz v. Fulton Trust Co.19 the income was payable to the settlor during her life and upon her death as
she might appoint by will and failing such appointment to
her next of kin. The gift to the next of kin was therefore
held to be equivalent to a reversion; and the trust, although
the deed recited that it was irrevocable, might be revoked
by the settlor at her pleasure.
In Hammond v. Chemung Canal Trust Co. 6" it was held
that where a trust agreement provided for the payment of
income to the settlor for life and the distribution of the
principal upon his death as he might appoint by his will,
or failing such appointment to his next of kin, such next of
kin acquired a beneficial interest therein and the trust could
not be revoked without their consent. This decision by a
single Justice of the Supreme Court is irreconcilable with
the Schwartz case, supra. It should be noted, however, that
the decision in the Schwartz case was handed down several
years before the decision by the Court of Appeals in the
Henry Whittemore case 61 which is cited in the Hammond
case.
In Stella v. New York Trust Co.62 the income of the
trust was payable to the settlor during her life. The trustee was directed to distribute the fund upon the settlor's
death as she should direct and appoint by her will; and in
default of such appointment, the trustee was to distribute
the trust property in the manner determined by the laws
of the state of New York. The settlor was the only person
in being who was beneficially interested in the trust; and,
no interest being vested in any one as next of kin, the settlor
was held to. have the right to revoke the trust.
' 119 Misc. 831, 198 N. Y. Supp. 275 (1922).
'Supra note 55.
'Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co., 250 N. Y. 298, 165 N. E. 454 (1929),
commented upon (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 913; (1929) 7 N. Y. U. L. Q. 543;
(1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 837. See infra note 79.
'224 App. Div. 50, 229 N. Y. Supp. 166 (1st Dept. 1928).
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In Baker v. Fifth Avenue Bank of New York 13 the income of the trust was to be paid to the settlor's wife during
her life, and upon her prior decease, to the settlor for his
life. Upon the death of the survivor, the principal was to
go to their issue, if any, and the survivor or survivors of
any of said issue, and the children of any deceased child
or children per stirpes. If upon the termination of the trust
there should be no surviving issue or descendant of the
settlor or of his wife, the principal was to go to two named
individuals, share and share alike, or, if either should be
then deceased, to the male issue and descendants per stirpes.
Failing any such, the principal was to go to the executors
of the will of the settlor for distribution pursuant thereto.
The settlor and his wife had no children. They executed a
separation agreement, by the terms of which the wife sold,
assigned, conveyed, transferred and released to the settlor
all her right, title and interest whatsoever in and to the
trust estate and consented to its revocation in whole or in
part by the settlor. The wife also released the trustee from
all liability or accountability, and directed the trustee to
pay the income to the settlor. Thereupon the settlor revoked
the trust in so far as it made provision for the payment of
the income thereof to the wife and directed the trustee to
pay the income thereafter to himself. By another writing
the wife consented to such revocation and directed the trustee to act accordingly. It was held that the trust for the
benefit of the wife had been revoked so far as she was concerned. It should be observed that the settlor did not terminate such part of the trust entirely. That part of the
trust relating to the settlor's own interest and the interest of
the remaindermen was preserved. Thus, no question of unlawful suspension with respect to the remaindermen in the
event of the settlor's decease prior to that of the wife was
presented.
In Cagliardi v. Bank of New York & Trust Co. 64 the
trust instrument directed the trustee upon the death of the
settlor to transfer the principal to such persons, and in
'225 App. Div. 238,.232 N. Y. Supp. 238 (1st Dept. 1928).
34 supra.
"'230 App. Div. 192, 243 N. Y. Supp. 573 (1st Dept. 1930).

See note
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such shares and proportions as the settlor might direct and
appoint by her last will and testament, and, in default of
such appointment, to those persons who at the time of her.
death should be her next of kin under the intestate laws
of the state of New York. The settlor's mother, who would
be her next of kin if the settlor were to die at the time, consented to the revocation of the trust. The court held that
the mother's consent was unnecessary. McAvoy, J., writing for the court, said: "We do not think the creator of
the trust contemplated creating a remainder in her intestate successors, the next of kin. Rather does the instrument
effect a reversion which would leave the right of revocation
intact."
In Franklin v. Chatham Pheni National Bank & Trust
0o.6 a husband and wife created a trust for a period of
ten years, subject to the prior demise of one or both of the
settlors; the income being payable to them. The trust instrument provided that if either of them died during the
term of the trust, the income was to be paid to the survivor
and at the expiration of the trust period the principal was
to be divided between the surviving beneficiary and the estate
of the deceased beneficiary, and if both died before the expiration of the trust period, then their respective shares
were to be paid to their estates. The language of the trust
instrument clearly created a reversion. There was no gift
over to next of kin.
Finally, in Berlenbach v. Chemical Banlk & Trust Co.60
the deed of trust provided that the income should be paid
to the settlor for a period of twenty years, at which time
the principal of the trust was to be returned to him. Upon
the death of the settlor before the expiration of the twentyyear period, the trustee was directed to pay over the principal of the trust estate to "such person or persons as the
grantor may, by his last will and testament, appoint, or in
default of such appointment, to the persons entitled under
his will to his residuary estate, or if he die intestate, to
the persons entitled to receive his personal property in case
'234 App. Div. 369, 255 N. Y. Supp. 115 (1st Dept. 1932).
C235 App. Div. 170, 256 N. Y. Supp. 563 (1st Dept. 1932), aff'd without
opinion, 260 N. Y. 539, 184 N. E. 83- (1932).
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of intestacy."
The settlor had a wife and an infant
child, both of whom were living. The question was whether
any person, other than the settlor, was beneficially interested in the trust. The court held that the next of kin
would take by descent and not by purchase; that the next
of kin had an expectancy, but no estate; and that there
was no intent to create a remainder, since no person other
than the settlor was specifically mentioned as a beneficiary.
After distinguishing the Henry Whittemore case, 67 Justice
Sherman said:
"Examining the indenture here, we find that the only
contingency upon which some one other than plaintiff could acquire an interest, would be his death prior
to the expiration of the twenty-year period. In making himself the sole beneficiary for twenty years, and
providing that then the estate return to him, if he
be then living, and not giving the trustee full control
over the investments of the fund, it is obvious that
he erected this trust for his own benefit. If the grantor had intended to strip himself of all rights and
to create a remainder in his next of kin which could
be divested only by the exercise of the power of appointment, he would have omitted some of those provisions and inserted such as would unmistakably have
so stated."
The decision in Doctor v. Hughes 68 does not pass upon
the question of revocability at all. It merely holds that,
where there is a direction to a trustee to convey real property to the heirs at law of the settlor of a trust, who himself reserves the income for life, the heirs at laiv do not
take a remainder in the trust estate and they have no interest therein which is attachable during the lifetime of the
settlor. Moreover, the trust involved in Doctor v. Hughes
was created in 1899. At that time there was in force section 83 of Chapter 547 of the Laws of 1896, which in sub"'Supra note 61. See infra note 79.
6225 N. Y. 305, 122 N. E. 221 (1919).
N. Y. 97, 159 N. E. 875 (1928).

See also Livingston v. Ward, 247
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stance provided that whenever a beneficiary of a trust entitled to the receipt of rents and profits of real property
became entitled to the whole or part of the principal fund,
he could release his interest in the rents and profits, and
that thereupon the estate of the trustee should cease.0 9
Clearly, under this provision, a trust would be revocable
in the event that the beneficiary was entitled to the entire
interest created by the trust. But this provision, which
thus permitted the termination of a trust was repealed in
1903.70
In Doctor v. Hughes, supra, the term "heirs" was construed to mean "next of kin" to effectuate a reversion rather
than a remainder. But in Genet v. Hunt 7' the direction
was not to heirs as such, but to those persons who would
be heirs under an assumed state of facts, which was contrary to the facts. The case turned upon the question
whether the trust created a remainder, and therefore gave
to others an interest in the trust or created a simple reversion. The trust consisted of both real and personal property and some of the real estate was located outside of the
state of New York. The remainder was to such person or
persons "being her heir or heirs-at-law as would be entitled
to take the same by descent from her in case the same was
land belonging to her, situate in the state of New York."
The majority of the court held that the deed of trust created a remainder, since the direction to pay gave the property to persons other than those who would have taken by
operation of law.
It should also be borne in mind that Doctor v. Hughes
involved a trust of real property and that the court there
applied the ancient common law rule that where there is
a gift to heirs, the heirs take by descent and not by purchase. 72 Nemo est haeres viventis. This rule, an outgrowth
Cf. note 32 supra for the corresponding provision as to personal property.
See N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW §103.
See also Speir v. Benvenuit, 194 App. Div. 769, 185 N. Y. Supp. 769 (2d Dept.
1921). In this connection see the authorities cited in note 33 mtpra.
113 N. Y. 158, 21 N. E. 91 (1889).
Campbell v. Rowdon, 18 N. Y. 412 (1858) ; Moore v. Littel, 41 N. Y. 66
(1869); Cushman v. Horton, 59 N. Y. 149 (1874); Umfreville v. Keeler, 1
Thomp. & C. 486 (N. Y. 1873); Robinson v. New York Life Ins. & Trust
'

70N. Y. Laws of 1903, c. 88, p. 239.
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of the feudal system, applied only to the tenure of land and
not to personal property. In the case of real estate the
property goes direct to the heirs. In the case of personal
property, however, the title vests, in the first instance, in
the personal representative.7 3 If a reversion rather than a
remainder has been created, it is the duty of the trustee, if
the settlor be not living at the date set for distribution,
to deliver the property to his executor or administrator.
This involves delay in the distribution of the property to
the beneficiaries and the payment of additional commissions
to the executor or administrator.
In this connection it should be further borne in mind
that there are other practical considerations for counsel to
regard. Upon the death of the settlor his estate may be
subject to federal and state estate taxes upon the value of
a reversion-taxes which might not be payable if the gift
to his next of kin takes effect as a remainder. Creditors
of the settlor may assert a claim against the reversion either
during the lifetime or at the death of the settlor, which
they could not do if the gift over constitutes a remainder.
Finally, the reservation of a right of revocation may
result in the settlor being compelled to pay an income tax
with respect to the trust estate; and the termination of a
right of revocation may subject the settlor or donee of the
74
power to a gift tax.

In the second group of cases, we shall briefly consider
the problems presented where there are persons having beneCo., 75 Misc. 361, 133 N. Y. Supp. 257 (1912); Schwartz v. Fulton Trust
Co., supra note 59. See also Heath v. Hewitt, 127 N. Y. 166, 27 N. E. 959
(1891).
Brewster v. Gaze, 280 U. S. 327, 50 Sup. Ct. 115 (1930) ; Blood v. Kane,
130 N. Y. 514, 29 N. E. 994 (1892) ; Matter of Bronson, 150 N. Y. 1, 44 N. E.
707 (1896); Matter of Embury, 19 App. Div. 214, 45 N. Y. Supp. 881 (1st
Dept. 1897), aff'd, 154 N. Y. 746, 49 N. E. 1096 (1897).
'Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280, 53 Sup. Ct. 369 (1933) ; Reinecke
v. Smith, 289 U. S. 172, 53; Sup. Ct. 570 (1933) ; Means v. United States, 39
F. (2d) 748 (Ct. Cl. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 849, 51 Sup. Ct. 28 (1930) ;
Jackson v. Commissioner, 64 F. (2d) 359 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933); cf. Porter v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 60 F. (2d) 673 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) ; Payne,
Inter Vivos Transfers and the Federal Estate Tax (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. Rv.
937, 951. See infra notes 100, 101.
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ficial interests in the trust arising by purchase under the
deed.
In Urackenthorpe v. Sickles 75 the settlor transferred
personal property to the trustee, under an agreement to pay
the income to the settlor during life and at her death to
distribute the fund to the settlor's appointees by will, and,
in default of such appointment, to divide the trust fund
equally among the settlor's surviving issue. The settlor
sought to revoke the trust even though she then had living
three infant children. The court held that the children had
a beneficial interest in the trust estate, which made it irrevocable without their consent.
In Williams v. Sage 76 the settlor provided by the terms
of the trust instrument that the income of the property
should be paid to his wife during her life; upon her death,
the corpus was to be divided into as many shares "as will
make one for each child" of the wife who should survive
her; and if there were issue, they were to take their parent's
share per stirpes. There was a further trust provision for
certain of the remaindermen in certain contingencies. One
of the children had a child of the age of three years. The
settlor had the consents of his wife, and of their three children, all of full age. The court held that the grandchild
was beneficially interested because a share was payable to
her if her mother predeceased her grandmother, the wife
of the settlor. Thomas, J., writing for the court, said at
page 6:
"I consider that the statute does not mean that only
the consent of those having a present interest must
consent to revocation of the trust; but rather that
there must be the consent of the beneficiaries interested in the trust. The statute was not regarding
the mere persons who took present title at the inception of the trust or during its continuance, but
rather the persons whom, upon its due execution, the
trust would benefit, and who, therefore, became interested in it."
7'156 App. Div. 753, 141 N. Y. Supp. 370 (1st Dept. 1913).
'0 180 App. Div. 1, 167 N. Y. Supp. 179 (2d Dept. 1917).
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In Court v. Bankers Trust Co. 7 7 it was held that where
the deed contained a limitation over to a class of persons
who would not be entitled to receive the property except
for the provisions of the deed itself, they necessarily took
by virtue of the deed and not by law, and there being members of such class then in existence who would take if the
preceding estate should then terminate, such persons had
an interest in the trust and their consent was necessary to
a revocation. Page, J., writing in Special Term, said at
page 479:
"The case ht bar is distinguishable from Whittemore
v. Equitable Trust Co., 162 App. Div. 607, 147 N. Y.
Supp. 1058, in that here the grantor evinced an intention to prevent her property from being distributed
according to law. Having no descendants, her personal property would by law, upon her death intestate, become the property of her husband, subject to
the payment of her debts (Robins v. McClure, 100
N. Y. 328, 3 N. E. 663, 53 Am. Rep. 184; Matter of
Russell, 168 N. Y. 169, 61 N. E. 166). She expressly
provided that it should not go to her husband, but
to the next of kin who are descendants of her father
and mother."
In Gage v. Irving Bank & Trust Co.78 the grantor established a trust fund for his own benefit during his life
and the deed provided that upon his death the trustee should
transfer the principal "to the issue of the grantor in equal
shares, per stirpes, and in default of such issue to the next
of kin of the grantor as determined by the laws of the state
of New York." At the time the deed of trust was made
the grantor had three infant children. Neither the right
to revoke the trust nor power of appointment by will over
the corpus of the fund was reserved. It was held that the
trust could not be revoked by the grantor without the consent of the infant children, since they were beneficially in-221 N. Y. 608, 116 N. E. 1041 (1917), aff'g, 172 App. Div. 955, 157
N. Y. Supp. 1121 (1st Dept. 1916).
"8222 App. Div. 92, 225 N. Y. Supp. 476 (2d Dept. 1927), aff'd without
opinion, 248 N. Y. 554, 162 N. E. 522 (1926).
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terested in the trust agreement. The children being infants,
their consent could not be obtained. The court was of the
opinion that by the use of the word "issue," the grantor
meant his children and children of any deceased child, since
under the terms of the trust agreement it was only in default
of issue that others would take by operation of law. The
court said: "This construction is justified by the use of
the words 'per stirpes' in the context, indicating that the
grantor did not intend descendants of every degree of remoteness to take in equal shares per capita."
Thus, it is well settled law in New York that when
property is put in trust for one's benefit for life, upon his
death to be transferred to named persons or to persons as
a class, the remaindermen, in being at the time of the attempted revocation, are "beneficially interested" to the extent that their consents to the revocation of the trust must
be procured.
In Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co.,79 sometimes referred to as the Henry Whittemore case, the trust agreement
provided for the payment of income to two named beneficiaries and upon their deaths for the distribution of the principal to the three settlors in equal shares if living; or if any
settlor should then be dead, his share should pass as appointed by his will, and failing such appointment, to his next of
kin. The court held that these provisions created not a reversion in the settlors but a remainder in their next of kin;
that such next of kin took by purchase and not by descent;
and that such next of kin constituted persons beneficially
interested in the trust whose consent to its revocation was
required. The court found that the written consents of all
the adult parties to the trust agreement, including the
settlors and a surviving life beneficiary, were insufficient to
revoke the trust because two of the settlors had minor children who, as presumptive next of kin, were persons beneficially interested in the trust and who did not and could
not consent to its revocation. It should be observed that
the Court of Appeals merely decided that all the parties in
interest did not and could not consent, because interests
19250 N. Y. 298, 165 N. E. 454 (1929), supra note 61.
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appeared to belong to infants who were incapable of giving
their consent.
The case of Doctor v. Hughes,80 supra, and the Henry
Whittemore case are not irreconcilable. The result in each
case depended upon the intent of the settlor of the trust
estate as gathered from the trust instrument taken as a
whole. The rule is that a grant to one's next of kin creates
a reversion in the settlor and gives nothing to the next of
kin by way of remainder, unless there be unambiguous and
unequivocal language indicating a contrary intent. Thus,
it would seem that the problem is, in the final analysis, a
matter of intention, which is primarily a question of construction of the language of the trust instrument.81
In Corbett v. Bank of New York & Trust 0o.82 the trust
agreement directed the trustee to pay the net income to the
settlor during his life. In the event his wife survived him,
to pay the income to her during her life and upon her death
the trust was to terminate, the principal to be paid over and
distributed as she appointed and directed by her will; any
part thereof not so appointed to be distributed as if she
had died the owner thereof intestate. In the event the wife
predeceased the settlor, then on his death the trust was to
terminate and the principal paid over and distributed as
if the settlor had died intestate. The settlor obtained written
consents to the revocation of the trust from his wife and
from all those persons who would constitute the next of kin
of himself and the next of kin of his wife had they died as
of the date of the revocation. All of such persons were of
full age and competent to give their consent. The trustee
contended that the persons who would be the next of kin
of the settlor and his wife upon their respective deaths could
not presently be ascertained. But the court held that it was
not necessary to obtain the consents of all the potential next
of kin and that it was only necessary that those persons who
8225 N. Y. 305, 122 N. E. 221 (1919), supra note 68.
'Berlenbach v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., supra note 66. See also
McKnight v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 254 N. Y. 417, 173 N. E. 568
(1930); Legis. (1931) 5 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 283; (1931) 29 MIcHa. L. REv.
650.
, 229 App. Div. 570, 242:N. Y. Supp. 638 (1st Dept. 1930).

REVOCABILITY OF TRUSTS

are the presumptive next of kin at the time of revocation
should consent. Justice O'Malley said at page 571:
"The Whittemore case (250 N. Y. 298) did not hold
that those interested as next of kin could not be
determined until the death of either party, as is here
contended. The implication there is to the effect that
if the children had not been minors and had consented,
the trust could have been revoked. Nothing contained
in that decision affects the rule that it is only those
who have a vested or contingent interest at the time
of the revocation whose consent must be obtained."
Finally, in Hfussey v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. 3
the income was payable to the settlor's wife during her life
and upon her death the principal was to be distributed as
she might appoint by will and failing such appointment it
was to be paid to the settlor, or if he were not living, to
those persons who would be his next of kin at the time of the
wife's death according to the laws of the state in which he
resided at the time of his death. If the settlor survived
his wife, the property would nevertheless pass in accordance
with the terms of her will, provided she exercised her power
to appoint. The settlor was a resident of Massachusetts
and under the laws of that state if the settlor should presently die, his daughter and an infant son would be his next
of kin. It was held that the settlor and his wife were not
the sole persons beneficially interested in the trust under
Section 23 of the Personal Property Law; that the consent
of the presumptive next of kin of the settlor to the revocation was required since they were to take under the trust
instrument as personae designatae and not by descent; and
that since an infant son of the settlor could not consent,
the trust could not be revoked. It should be noted that the
power of appointment was conferred upon the life beneficiary instead of upon the settlor, as was the case in the
Henry Whittemore case, supra. In the Hussey case the wife
was given not only the income of the trust but unlimited
'236 App. Div. 117, 258 N. Y. Supp. 396 (1st Dept. 1932), aff'd without
opinion, 261 N. Y. 533, 185 N. E. 726 (1933).
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power to dispose of the principal by her will. Nor was her
power to appoint contingent upon her surviving him. Thus
there was stronger evidence of an intention on the part of
the settlor in the Hussey case to make a complete disposition of all his interest in the trust property than there was
in the Henry Whittemore case. 84 The fact that in the Hussey
case the power of appointment was conferred upon the life
beneficiary instead of upon the settlor serves to make a
stronger case of irrevocability.
III
We have seen that, as a general rule, in the absence of
the reservation of a power to revoke, the settlor alone cannot revoke the trust. However, the settlor may be able to
revoke the trust where the instrument gives the settlor absolute power of disposition of the corpus and income. Such
powers may be the equivalent of an implied power of
revocation. 5
Sometimes the settlor may accomplish by indirection a
revocation of the trust when the right of revocation is not
expressly reserved. Thus, in Meyer v. Bank of Manhattan
Trust Co.86 the deed provided that it should not be revoked,
but the settlor had a power to change the beneficiaries. He
made his wife sole cestui que trust and with her consent
successfully revoked the trust. And in Faulkner v. Irving
Trust Co.87 the settlor could not revoke the trust until he
was thirty-five years old, the income being paid to him. The
deed permitted the settlor to amend the instrument "in any
manner whatsoever," except that he should not amend it
so as to withdraw any of the securities comprising a portion
of the principal from the operation of the trust. The settlor's
sister was an eventual beneficiary. By an amendment, the
settlor changed the trust instrument by divesting his sister
of all beneficial interest. As amended, the settlor's executors
' Supra note 79.
'McKnight v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., supra note 81; Legis.
(1931) 5 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 283; (1931) 29 Micia. L. REv. 650.
'232 App. Div. 228, 249 N. Y. Supp. 640 (1st Dept. 1931).
*'231 App. Div. 87, 246 N. Y. Supp. 313 (1st Dept. 1930).
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or administrators were to receive the trust fund in the event
of his death, before revocation of the trust, in the absence
of a distribution being directed by his will. The next day

the settlor sought to revoke the trust. It was held that the
sister's consent was not required; and there being no other
person in being having either a vested or contingent interest

in the trust, the revocation was effectual.

However, such a

device whereby the rights of existing beneficiaries may be

circumvented has been questioned.88
We have also seen that where the settlor expressly reserves the power to revoke the trust, generally there is no
difficulty as to its revocation by him. However, there may
be practical problems if the reserved power to revoke requires the joint action of the settlor and a third party. Thus,
the deed may require the approval of one or more cestui que
trustent 89 or that of the trustee.9 0

On the other hand, no one can constitute an irrevocable
trust for himself by placing his own property in trust with
remainder over to others, by reserving the beneficial enjoyment of the income to himself for his life. ,And where the
trust fund was created by the settlor for his own benefit,
the settlor may assign the income therefrom. 9 1 Nor may
' Porter v. Commissioner, supra note 74. Of course, if the written consent
to the revocation of the trust by the persons beneficially interested is obtained
by fraudulent misrepresentation, the trust is not revoked. Hutchinson v. Ross,
233 App. Div. 516, 253 N. Y. Supp. 889 (1st Dept. 1931), aff'd, 262 N. Y. 381,
187 N. E. 65 (1933).
I"Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 12; Reinecke
v. Northern Trust Co., supra note 3.
coFarmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, supra note 1; Reinecke v. Smith,
289 U. S. 172, 53 Sup. Ct. 570 (1933) ; Payne, Inter Vivos Tranfers and the
Special Estate Tax (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 937,,956.
In Matter of Vanderbilt, 20 Hun 520 (N. Y. 1880) the trust deed provided
that the trust might be terminated at any time as to all or any part of the trust
fund upon the joint consent or agreement in writing of the settlor, the cestui
que trust and the trustee. Davis, P. J., said at p. 525:
"The only 'power' connected with it is that of terminating an existing
trust, in respect of which, the donor, the beneficiary and the trustee
occupy the same independent relation. Each is to act upon the volition
of his own judgment, and neither can be compelled by any process
known to the law to mould his judgment to the wish or impulse of
either or both of the others."
Schenck v. Barnes, 156 N. Y. 316, 50 N. E. 967 (1898) ; Newton v. Hunt,
134 App. Div. 325, 119 N. Y. Supp. 3 (1st Dept. 1909), aff'd without opinion,
201 N. Y. 599, 95 N. E. 1134 (1911); Matter of Blake, 226 App. Div. 580,
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one constitute an irrevocable trust for himself in the income,
and the reversionary fee in a person not in existence. 2
Before a trust deed can be construed as irrevocable, it must
confer on some actual person not merely a hope of succession, but a right; 93 but that right may be either vested or
contingent. 94 If when the deed is delivered there is no beneficiary in existence-thus rendering the trust revocable by
the settlor-it may become irrevocable by the coming into existence of a beneficiary other than the settlor.9 r However,
a trust in terms irrevocable in favor of beneficiaries not yet
in existence may be held revocable."6 While an irrevocable
trust may be constituted in favor of an existent beneficiary
other than the settlor, the rule, being exclusive, can only be
demonstrated by those cases in which, for want of any such
remaindermen, the trust was held to be revocable. The rule
of the existent beneficiary seems to rest on the principle
that a trust to be irrevocable must protect rights capable of
being directly granted by irrevocable deed; and conversely,
that a gift of property which at the time of making the gift
could not be the subject of direct disposition, cannot be
rendered irrevocable by interposition of a trust. Wherever
an irrevocable trust has been held to have been constituted,
the existence of a living beneficiary other than the settlor
has been a circumstance of moment in the decision.
CONCLUSIONS

If the owner of property transfers it to a trustee to pay
the income to himself for life, and provides in the trust in235 N. Y. Supp. 324 (1st Dept. 1929), aff'd without opinion, 252 N. Y. 613,
170 N. E. 163 (1930); Phelps v. Thompson, 119 Misc. 875, 198 N. Y. Supp.
320 (1922) ; Hobbert v. Jackson, 134 Misc. 618, 235 N. Y. Supp. 642 (1929).
1 Kingsbridge Imp. Co. v. American Exchange Pacific Nat. Bank, 222 App.
Div. 31, 225 N. Y. Supp. 355 (1st Dept. 1927), aff'd, 249 N. Y. 97, 162 N. E.
597 (1928) ; Berlenbach v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., supra note 66; Stella
v. New York Trust Co., supra note 62; Matter of Merritt, 94 Misc. 425, 159
N. Y. Supp. 588 (1916) ; Schwartz v. Fulton Trust Co., supra note 28; Phelps
v. Thompson, 119 Misc. 875, 198 N. Y. Supp. 320 (1922); Evans, The Tertnination of Trusts (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1070.
'Aranyi

v. Bankers' Trust Co., supra note 56; Franklin v. Chatham

Phenix Nat. Bank & Trust Co., supra note 65.

Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co., supra notes 61, 79; Gage v. Irving
Bank & Trust Co., supra note 78; Williams v. Sage, supra note 76.
Hussey v. City Bank Farmer's Trust Co., supra. note 83.
Berlenbach v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., supra note 66.
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strument that on his death intestate it shall pass by descent
to his next of kin, in that event the settlor is the only person
in being who is beneficially interested in the trust. Hence
he can revoke it of his own volition; the incidental benefit
of the trustee in its commissions being immaterial.9 7 But
if the owner of property transfers it to a trustee to pay the
income to himself or another as life beneficiary, and provides in the trust instrument that on the termination of the
trust the property shall, in certain contingencies, pass in
remainder to a class of persons described as the settlor's
next of kin-so that they take by purchase98 rather than
by descent 99 -in that event the settlor and life beneficiary
are not the only person or persons beneficially interested in
the trust. Hence he or they cannot revoke the same in the
absence of consents by all the persons in being who are presumptively beneficially interested in the fund by remainder.
The ability on the part of the settlors, either to permit
their next of kin to take by descent or to make inter vivos
gifts to their next of kin to be taken by purchase, has implications of highly practical importance. For instance, if
a settlor's next of kin are merely to take by descent, so that
the settlor can revoke the trust, the interest of the settlor
in the trust property is subject to the rights of creditors
and to an estate tax on the settlor's death. 0 0 But if a
settlor makes an inter vivos gift in remainder, which his
next of kin take by purchase and which the settlor cannot
revoke without the consent of all the prospective donees,
such gift in remainder does not necessarily give rise to a
similar tax. 01 ' The legal privilege to effectuate either purpose and to incur its consequences is unquestioned. But
"Aranyi v. Bankers' Trust Co., supra note 56.
03Cf. Genet v. Hunt, 113 N. Y. 158, 21 N. E. 91 (1889) ; Guaranty Trust
Co. v. Halsted, 245 N. Y. 447, 157 N. E. 739 (1927).
' Cf. New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Cary, 191 N. Y. 33, 83 N. E.
598 (1908); Livingston v. Ward, 247 N. Y. 97, 159 N. E. 875 (1928).
10 Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327, 49 Sup. Ct. 126
(1929). And to income tax, see the authorities cited in note 74, stipra.
inReinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 49 Sup. Ct. 123 (1929);
May v. Heiner, 281 U. S. 238, 50 Sup. Ct. 286 (1930); Payne, Inter Vivos
Transfers and the Federal Estate Tax (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 937.
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which purpose was intended 102 by the settlor is sometimes
a difficult question of construction.
There has been a lack of harmony in the decisions as
to who are persons beneficially interested within the meaning of Section 23 of the Personal Property Law. The test
seems to be the intent of the settlor as to retaining a reversion in himself, or giving beneficial interests in other persons.
This is a question of construction with reference to the
particular deed of trust involved.
PHILIP M. PAYNE.

New York City.

'Cf. Heermans v. Robertson, 64 N. Y. 332 (1876) ; Townsend v. Trommer, 125 N. Y. 446, 26 N. E. 805 (1891); Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v.
Callan, 246 N. Y. 481, 159 N. E. 405 (1927); Central Union Trust Co. v.
Trimble, 255 N. Y. 88, 174 N. E. 72 (1930).

